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RECENT DECISIONS
The Bankrupt's Right to Loss-Carryback Tax Refunds: Segal
v. Rochelle-In Segal v. Rochelle' the United States Supreme Court
foreclosed a bankrupt's windfall and amplified section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act.2 A unanimous Court ruled that claims for loss-carry-
back tax refunds, due a bankrupt for losses suffered prior to the filing
of bankruptcy, vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. Three circuit courts of
appeals had split on this point. The First Circuit in Fournier v. Rosen-
blum, 3 and the Third Circuit in In re Sussman,4 held that claims to the
refund remained in the bankrupt. In the Segal case the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the trustee was entitled to the claim,5 thus establishing the
split which the Supreme Court resolved.
On September 27, 1961, voluntary bankruptcy petitions were filed
in a federal court in Texas by Gerald Segal, Sam Segal, and their busi-
ness parnership, Segal Cotton Products. Rochelle was appointed trustee
in bankruptcy. After December 31, 1961, the Segals sought and obtained
loss-carryback tax refunds from the United States under section 172 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This section allows a taxpayer who
suffers a net operating loss for his taxable year to credit that loss against
his gross income for the three preceding years and the five succeeding
years. The entire loss is carried back to the first year, what remains
over the taxable income of that year to the second year, and so on until
the loss is exhausted. Application for the refund may not be made until
the close of the taxable year in which the loss was sustained. In this
case, the losses were carried back to 1959 and 1960 to reduce income
on which the Segals had paid taxes in those years, and entitle them to
a refund.
On agreement, the Segals applied to the referee in bankruptcy to
award them the refund, as opposed to awarding it to the trustee. Four
years later the United States Supreme Court handed down the final
solution to the problem. The claims pass -to the trustee by section
70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act6 which section vests in the trustee
"property... which prior to the filing of the petition ... [the bank-
rupt] could by any means have transferred . .
2 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
230 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (5) (1964).
3318 F. 2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963).
4289 F .2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1961).
5 336 F. 2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964).
630 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (5) (1964). More fully, this
section states: "a. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall . . .be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the
filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, except insofar as
it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all the following kinds of
property wherever located .. . (5) property, including rights of action, which
prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him,
or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered . . ."
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The Concept of Property
The courts in both Fournier and Sussman held the claim for the
refund to be too tenuous to be classified as "property." It could not be
presented to the Internal Revenue Service as a claim until the close
of the taxable year. Between the filing of bankruptcy and the close of
the year, the bankrupt could erase his right to the refund by receiv-
ing enough income to offset his prior losses during the year. The
courts, therefore, viewed his interest as a mere expectancy. It was not
"property," because the bankrupt, at the time of filing, could point to
"no existing fund or cause of action in which he had any legal or equit-
able interest."'
The Fifth Circuit avoided this result by viewing the interest as a
possibility coupled with an interest:
This right of action springs from and rests on the fact that the
income taxes theretofore paid were paid subject to adjustment in
the event of future losses, and are available for that purpose to
the end of providing the refund. The right to adjustment is
definite; the time for filing the claim is definite; only the amount
of the refund is contingent, and this meets the test of a pos-
sibility vested with an interest .... 8
Past cases have held that a vested interest subject to complete di-
vestment,9 a contingent interest'0 and a possibility coupled with an
interest" pass to the trustee under section 70a(5), but that an expect-
ancy does not.12 Rather than plunging into this entanglement to seek
out a label for a claim to a tax refund, the Court stated that "property"
under section 70a(5) will not be bound by such technical distinctions.
It stated that "the term 'property' has been construed most generously
and an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent
or because enjoyment must be postponed."" The Court also held that,
in interpreting this section, "it is impossible to give any categorical
definition to the word 'property' ...,,4
The Bankruptcy Act defines "property" according to its own pur-
poses.' 5 Broadly speaking, those purposes are to secure all the valuable
property of the bankrupt for his creditors, while still leaving him
7In re Sussman, 289 F. 2d 76, 78 (3rd Cir. 1961).
8 Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F. 2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1964).
9 Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
10 Horton v. Moore, 110 F. 2d 189 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 692 (1940).
11 Kleinschmidt v. Schroeter, 94 F. 2d 707 (9th Cir. 1938).
12In re Baker, 13 F. 2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926).
3 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
'14 Id. Actually, the Court is making a specific application of the doctrine that
bankruptcy courts should exercise their equitable powers in such manner that
"fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done." Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). See also AM. Jux 2d Bankruptcy §848 (1963).
15 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). The concept of property is not
governed by state law, as is the concept of transferability. See note 21 infra
and accompanying text.
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free to make a fresh start. This freedom to gain new wealth after
he has filed is the main limitation on the broad construction of "prop-
erty" contained in section 70a(5).1 However, the Court felt that the
claim to the loss-carryback tax refund "is sufficiently rooted in the
pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability
to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as
'property' under section 70a(5)."'1 These refunds are unlike future
wages or an intended bequest, neither of which would pass to the
trustee, because it springs directly from the bankrupt's past. The re-
fund, if paid, will be paid because the bankrupt has "earned" it (i.e.,
by operating at a net loss) in his pre-bankruptcy past. Furthermore,
whether it is technically classified as an expectancy or not, it is a thing
of substance. The bankrupt has paid taxes in the past and is operating
at a net loss at the time of filing. The possibility that the bankrupt will
erase the loss during the remainder of the year in which the petition
is filed is unlikely.
Of course whatever income he does receive during the remainder
of the year would reduce the refund; thus the claim, though vested in
the trustee, would be open to both partial and total divestment. If the
bankrupt continues to lose money after filing, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has suggested that a "proration of the refund in the ratio of
the losses before and after the filing date would be indicated . . .""
Also, although it chose not to deal directly with the question, the
Supreme Court implied that any claims to net loss-carryover refunds
(i.e., a loss so great that it would carry over into the five succeeding
years) would not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. The carryover lacks
the substance and relative certainty of the carryback. While the latter
definitely has prior gross income against which it may be charged, the
former has no such existing fund-it can look only to contingent future
earnings. Apparently, this is enough to distinguish the two in the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court.19
The Concept of Transferability
Under section 70a(5) the interest must not only be "property" but
must also be "transferable" at the time of filing.20 Save on rare occa-
16 Of course, §70(a) (5) itself, including its concept of property, is limited by the
rest of the Bankruptcy Act. E.g., there are exemptions within §6, and there are
eight classes of property enumerated in §70(a). That these specific enumera-
tions qualify the general meaning of property within (5), see Board of Trade
v. Weston, 243 F. 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1917).
17 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
18 Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F. 2d 298, 302 n.5 (5th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
notes but does not expressly adopt this approach. Segal v. Rochelle, note 17
supra, at 380 n.5.
19 Segal v. Rochelle, note 17 supra, at 381. Also, since the purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are to govern, keeping the estate open for such a length of time
would seem to work a hardship on the bankrupt
20 The section also provides for vesting in the trustee, if alternatively the property
"might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or
1966]
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sions, the federal courts will follow state law in determining whether
or not particular property is transferable. They will then follow federal
law in determining whether that particular transfer falls within the
meaning of section 70a.
21
However, before even approaching the applicable state law (here,
that of Texas), the Court in Segal deals with the problem of the federal
"anti-assignment" statute.2 2 This statute would appear to be an in-
superable bar to assignment of net loss-carryback refunds, as it states
that "all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United
States . . .shall be absolutely null and void" unless certain conditions
are .met, such as the allowance of the claim and the ascertainment of
the amount due.23 Obviously, the achievement of these conditions at
the time of filing is not possible.
It has been held that this statute does not apply to transfers by
operation of law.2 4 Since section 70a(5) provides that "the trustee
... shall ... be vested by operation of law with the title of the bank-
rupt . . .," the trustee argued that the non-assignment statute did not
apply. However, the Court ruled that "transferable" in section 70a(5)
means that the bankrupt could have voluntarily transferred the interest
at the time of filing.25 Once it has been hypothetically determined that
the property could have been transferred voluntarily at the time of
filing, it vests by operation of law in the trustee. It is only the latter
transaction which is exempt from the anti-assignment statute.
However, just as the Court avoided the technical limitations of the
word "property" by looking to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, so
it avoided the literal application of the words "absolutely null and
void" by looking to the purposes of the anti-assignment statute. In
otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered .. " 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (5) (1964). However, both the trustee and the
Court recognize those procedures do not apply here. Segal v. Rochelle, note
17 s upra, at 382 n.8.
214 Collier, Bankruptcy, 70.15 at pp. 1034-35 n.22 (14th ed. 1962).
22 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1966).
23Rev. Stat. §3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1964). Sussman relied on
this as an alternative reason for not allowing the claim for the tax refund to
vest in the trustee. Fournier did not discuss this point.
24 United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1949).
25 "Not only is there practically no form of property that would not be transfer-
able under the broader reading, but it also makes redundant the alternative
route for complying with §70 (a) (5) through showing that the property 'might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process ... ' Segal v. Rochelle,
382 U.S. 375, 382 (1966).
The Court thus requires voluntariness, even though the Bankruptcy Act defines
"transfer" as including "the sale and every other and different mode, direct or
indirect, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest therein
or with the possession thereof or fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest
therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or withoutjudicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, pledge, mortgage, lien,
encumbrance, gift, security or otherwise .. " (Emphasis added.) Bankruptcy
Act §1(30) 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §1(30) (1964). The Court justifies
this by holding that Congress did not intend this definition to apply to "trans-
fer" as it is used within §70(a) (5).
(Vol. 50
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Martin v. National Surety Co., the Court interpreted this statute as
being primarily "to give protection to the Government," 26 so that it
did not become "embroiled in conflicting claims, with delay and em-
barrassment and the chance of multiple liability. 7 Once it had paid the
claim to its original owner, the government would no longer be in
danger or be concerned. Therefore it would not be contrary to the anti-
assignment statute to allow the enforcement of a previously "null and
void" assignment as between the parties themselves. So once the as-
signor had been paid, the assignee could enforce his right under the
doctrine of equitable assignment. Equity will force the assignor to com-
ply with the invalid assignment by causing him to transfer his recovery
to the assignee .
2
In this case the doctrine of equitable assignment serves a twofold
purpose: a.) it prevents strict application of the anti-assignment statute,
and b.) it expands the meaning of "by any means" transferable in sec-
tion 70a(5). In the latter sense the Segal case vindicates a 1930 holding
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In re Landis declared that
"by any means" transferable included not only transfers in law but
also transfers enforceable only in equity.29 No other circuit ever sup-
ported Landis, and at least five circuits have expressly refused to allow
future interests that aren't freely transferable to pass to the trustee.30
Their most forceful argument (in addition to the policy argument that
passing an expectancy led to a maximum of sacrifice on the debtor's
part with a minimum of gain on the creditor's part, since the sale of an
26 300 U.S. 588, 596 (1937).
27 Id. at 594.
28 It is interesting to note that if the bankrupt actually did make such an assign-
merit to a debtor, the assignment would not be a perfected transfer but would
be judged "preferential" and voided under §§3 (a) (2), 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, unless the assignor-bankrupt was paid on his claim at least four months
before the filing of bankruptcy. M~atter of Ideal Mercantile Corporation, 244
?. 2d 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 355 U.S. 856 (1957). And the assignee himself
cannot sue the Government on the claim, even if he joins the assignor. UnitedStates v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1958).
-Iowever, for the purposes of the hypothetical transfer of §70(a) (5), it is
simply enough that the bankrupt could have assigned his interest at the time of
filing, which assignment the assignee could enforce whenever (and if) the as-
signor received payment of his claim.
For further problems caused by the anti-assignment statute, see 12 A.L.R. 2d
460 (1950).
2941 F. 2d 700, 702 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 282 U.S. 872 (1930).
30 52 Calif. L. Rev. 129, 135 (1964). To be freely transferable the interest must
be "transferable without consideration by quitclaim deed to a stranger to the
title." Halbach, Creditors' Rights in Future Interests, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 217,
224 (1958).
Nor did the decision fare well at the hands of the critics. Professor Simes has
stated that ". . . a more reasonable interpretation of the statute would be to
the effect that transferable 'by any means' really means transferable 'by every
means.' That is to say, the statute refers to interests which are alienable with-
out restriction." SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §40, at 120 (1951). See also 2
PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 287, at 520 (1950) and Restatement, Property §168,
comments e, f (1936). But that there were those who did support Landis, see
4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 70.37, at pp. 1293-95 n.6 (14th ed. 1962) and Mac-
Lachlan, "By Any Means," 67 Com. L. J. 193 (1962).
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expectancy would not bring proceeds commensurate with the interest
given up) was section 70a( 7 ) of the Bankruptcy Act. 31 This section
vests in the trustee
"contingent remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights
of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverter,
and like interests in real property, which were nonassignable
prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months thereafter,
become assignable interests or estates or give rise to powers in
the bankrupt to acquire assignable interests or estates . . ."
As can be appreciated, even though some of these interests could not
have been assigned at law in some jurisdictions, they were all assign-
able in equity. If "by any means" transferable in (5) was to include
assignments in equity, why would Congress pass interests to trustee
by subsection (7) which would have already passed by subsection (5) ?
Although the Supreme Court did not deal with this inconsistency,
their rationale probably would have been: a.) the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act are to control;3 b.) section 70a(7) was added to the
Act in 1938,33 while loss-carryback refunds were not created until
1939 ;34 c.) section 70a(7) passes some interests (e.g., devises received
within six months of bankruptcy) which would not pass by section
70a(5) because of a failure to qualify as "property."
At any rate, having approved the doctrine of equitable assignment,
the Court then looked to the state law of Texas and noted that its courts
of equity would enforce such an assignment.3 5 Thus, the claim is trans-
ferable at the time of filing. Having already passed the "property" test,
the bankrupt's claims for loss-carryback tax refunds vested in the
trustee by operation of law.36
3130 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (7) (1964).
32 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
3 52 Stat. 880 (1938).
34 53 Stat. 867 (1939).35 Trinity Univ. Ins. Co. v. First State Bank, 143 Tex. 164, 183 S.W. 2d 422
(1944). The Court also states that a Texas court of equity might even force a
reluctant assignor to collect such claim. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 385
(1966). However, the Court cites no authority for this and does not appear to
be deeming such action necessary. It is enough that the equity court would
force a transfer, once the assignor had received payment.
36The bankrupt may have claims for other tax refunds which would also pass
to the trustee. In Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F. 2d 725, 728 (3rd Cir. 1925), there
was an overpayment of taxes by the bankrupt.
The court ruled it passed to the trustee by §70(a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act,
which vests in the trustee "rights of action . . . [for] the unlawful taking or
detention of... property."
However, since the Internal Revenue Service isn't really in the position of an
unlawful taker, the better interpretation is that the claim to a refund would
pass by §70(a) (5). This was the procedure in In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837,
847 (S.D. Cal. 1962), dealing with a refund of withholding taxes. The 5th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals approved of it passing by §70 (a) (5) rather than
§70(a) (6). Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F. 2d 298, 303 n.7 (5th Cir. 1964).
As to withholding taxes, "The trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to that part of
a federal income tax refund attributable to withholdings from the wages of the
bankrupt prior to his bankruptcy, and the amount of the refund attributable
[Vol. 50
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The Court's expansion of the term "transferable" was a natural
corollary to its freeing of the term "property." The same technical dis-
tinctions that had restricted "property" would have reappeared in a
limited definition of "transferable" (i.e., it may now be property, but
it still is not transferable) to defeat the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act. The only real limitations within section 70a(5)37 now appear to
be whether or not the interest is one sufficiently connected with the
bankrupt's future and his ability to make a fresh start, and whatever
limits the equity courts of a particular state may apply.38
BRuCE C. O'NEILL
Municipal Corporations: The Rule of Reason As Applied to
Annexations-In Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine,' the
village of Elmwood Park sought a reversal of the judgment of the
circuit court dismissing its petition for annexation to the town of Mt.
Pleasant. Elmwood Park was incorporated as a village in 1960 and
has an area of approximately 103.51 acres and a population of 432.
Mt. Pleasant, which was to be annexed, has an area of approximately
22,810 acres and a population of 12,023. Both Elmwood Park and Mt.
Pleasant border on the city of Racine and receive many of their gov-
ernmental services under contract from Racine. Apparently out of fear
of continued loss of territory to the city, Mt. Pleasant sought to merge
with Elmwood Park and they worked out an agreement to accomplish
that purpose.
In order to carry out the proposed merger, Mt. Pleasant and Elm-
wood Park had a choice of proceeding under either the consolidation
statute, section 66.02, or the annexation statute, section 66.024. The
consolidation statute sets forth a procedure for consolidating any town,
village or city with a continguous town, village or city. Generally, the
procedure calls for an ordinance to be passed by a two-thirds vote of
each board or council and by a majority of votes in each municipality
to withholdings from wages thereafter is the property of the bankrupt." 3
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, §1211.11 (Supp. 1966). That the exact refund may
not be determined or claimed until the end of the taxable year would make no
difference as the United States Supreme Court has now established.
37 That there are substantial limitations on §70(a) (5) from without, see note
16 supra.35 In Wisconsin, future interests, whether vested or contingent, are alienable at
law. Wis. STATS. §§230.07-..13, 230.35 (1963). That this applies to future inter-
ests in both realty and personalty, see Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 16-18, 258
N.W. 391, 393-94 (1935) and Estate of Tantillo, 24 Wis. 2d 19, 22, 127 N.W.
2d 798, 800 (1964).
An expectancy may not be assigned at law, however, such assignment, if sus-
tained by a sufficient consideration, will be enforced in equity. Hofmeister v.
Hunter, 230 Wis. 81, 88, 283 N.W. 330, 333 (1939). Thus it would seem the
claim for a loss-carryback tax refund of a Wisconsin bankrupt would also vest
in the trustee in bankruptcy.
'Village of Elmwood Park v. City of Racine, 29 Wis. 2d 400, 139 N.W. 2d
2d 66 (1966).
